Info on Blog

Tuesday, December 21, 2021

Your 2021 Giants Post-Mortem: The Subtle Art of Shoving it up Their Butt

As Clay Bellinger indelicately put it after the Dodgers, ugh, beat the Giants in the 2021 NLDS, the first time the long-time rivals met in the Divisional Playoffs era, Logan Webb "Huge props to Logan Webb ... he shoved it ... up our butt, twice"

Twittter Video Link

ogc thoughts

As I've been talking about for a number of years now, pitching is how a baseball team can control a game. When the pitcher is on, he can "shove it up" the other team's butt, consistently. So if you want to build a team, you focus more on finding pitchers than on finding hitters, and for hitters, equal focus on defense as well as offense.  

I've loved what Zaidi has done organizationally with regards to pitching. From hiring Matt Daniels from Driveline (versus what the Phillies did with Driveline coming in basically as consultants) to be the Giants Coordinator of Pitching Analytics (then recently promoted to Coordinator of Pitching Science) to hiring Brian Bannister to be the Giants Director of Pitching, I've been beyond glad about the advances the Giants have made on the pitching front. I think the results with the pitchers acquired shows how much impact their addition has made to the team.

Wow, side note, I just checked out Bannister's LinkedIn profile, and here is what it says for what he does for the Giants:

Predictive Analytics, Machine Learning, Pitch Design, 3D Motion Capture, Ball Physics, Biomechanical Modeling, Visual/Cognitive Deception

Plus, this is the firm he started up, Baseball VFX, which apparently is still active:

Original sabermetric research for optimal player development, scouting, projection, and valuation.

Which is good stuff for someone in his position. 

Finding Ace Pitching 

What I've haven't been happy about was his focus on hitting in his drafts, in particular, his first two drafts. As we know, it takes time for prospects to matriculate to the majors. In addition, we know that the best bullets (as illustrated in my draft study, exponentially better) by far are the top draft picks, and he focused a lot of his draft capital on hitters in his first two drafts.  I'm glad that the personnel he has added to the staff helps with developing both our free agents signees like Gausman and Wood, as well as our prospects, but the best way to a long term supply of good pitchers is to draft them with high picks (like he finally did in 2021), and to then develop them. 

Sure, you can find some via free agency, some via trades, but free agents are the leftovers that other teams let go (unless they are Boras clients) and trades are the leftover pitchers that other teams let go because they don't see him as vital to winning.  You can never be assured that a team will give up a Scherzer or a Greinke (or that such a player will agree to be traded to you, some have trade veto power), or better, a young pitcher just figuring it out.

I discussed a lot of this in my baseball business plan, where I discuss the positives of having two aces. You (obviously) want a pitcher who can dominate regularly in his starts. That's in line with Zaidi's 51/49 mantra, finding every minute advantage, as long as the move makes you better.

However, this is probably where he decides not to pursue pitching: TINSTAAPP (There Is No Such Thing As A Pitching Prospect). The saying came up because for pitching, either you figure out how to pitch in the majors or you don't, as a prospect is one that will get better with experience, like hitters do. But pitchers don't get better in that way (well, most of the time, some figure out sequencing to develop an advantage over the hitter), they are what they are until they develop a new pitch, whether an actual new pitch or a tweak of a current pitch to make it more effective (something Matt Daniels helps with).

And the theory then goes, once you got an MLB pitcher, you need to use him in the majors, because there is an unknown date of expiration for the pitcher, because pitchers are more fragile than hitters, and break down more. Due to this fragility, there is a segment of the sabermetric society who don't want to draft pitchers with their best draft picks. So I was glad to see the Giants draft Bednar this year, shows that the Giants under Zaidi is not against doing this.

And this becomes even more important because Zaidi follows another sabermetric truism, to not give large contracts to free agent pitchers, which is one of three ways to acquire your aces: drafting, trading, and free agent signings. While there is not always an ace level starter available in free agency, sometimes the fates crash your young pitchers on the rocks of the shore and there is none available in trade. 

If you avoid pitching via free agency, and you avoid pitching through the draft, and you don't want to give up great prospects in trade, where are you going to get your ace pitching? Because ace pitching gives you an advantage in short series, as we see next.

PQS Percentages: Example of How Multiple Aces Work in Short Series:  Back in 2008

Basically you can treat the PQS percentages as probabilities that are additive across a series. If you have the rotation set (estimated DOM/DIS) with Lincecum (70% DOM, 10% DIS), Cain (50% DOM, 20% DIS), Sanchez (50% DOM, 20% DIS) , Zito (30% DOM, 30% DIS):

  • by the end of three games, you have 1.7 DOM, 0.8 NEU, 0.5 DIS
  • by the end of four games, you have 2.0 DOM, 1.2 NEU 0.8 DIS
  • by the end of the five game series, you have 2.7 DOM, 1.4 NEU, 0.9 DIS

Thus, roughly, you would expect 3 DOM starts, 1 NEU (or flip a coin start) and 1 DIS start. The other team having roughly 50/40/30/30 DOM would have 2 DOM starts, 2 NEU and 1 DIS. Better odds, eh? Especially when you need to win 3 games.

For a seven game series:

  • by the end of three games, you have 1.7 DOM, 0.8 NEU, 0.5 DIS
  • by the end of four games, you have 2.0 DOM, 1.2 NEU 0.8 DIS
  • by the end of five games , you have 2.7 DOM, 1.4 NEU, 0.9 DIS
  • by the end of six games, you have 3.2 DOM, 1.7 NEU, 1.1 DIS
  • by the end of the seven game series, you have 3.7 DOM, 2.0 NEU, 1.3 DIS

Again, roughly 4 DOM starts, 2 NEU, 1 DIS, that is a difference vs. 3 DOM, 2 NEU, 2 DIS. Not a great difference, but when you are dealing with the playoffs, you should want every edge that you can get and this strategy is expected to gain you one extra win per series.  And Zaidi gets that, noting in his introductory press conference that a team needs to make many 51/49 decisions, and must not let bad results get in the way of using the right process in managing a team.

Dominance Pays Off in the Playoffs

Again, this is probably where Zaidi does not see ace pitching as a 51/49 proposition: pitching fails, a lot. They are risky assets which can break down at a moment's notice. 

But there's no getting around that. Zaidi has been able to cobble together staffs, with LA and the Giants, where the goal is finding 162 starts, not five starting pitchers, and win that way. I agree that this is a winning strategy for getting through the long gauntlet of a MLB season, he has demonstrated it in his last two jobs. That's great, if all you want to do is get into the playoffs. 

This is not a great strategy for winning in the playoffs, however. As I illustrated above, with DOM/DIS, there is a significant advantage, gaining you one win on average. And in a 5 or 7 game series, if you get that one win expected, then you only need to play .500 in the other 4/6 games to win the series.

Here are my studies on the benefits of having DOM starts in the playoffs. Obviously, great to have them, want to have them. The stats shows to what degree of advantage it is, rather than the nebulous "yeah, it's good":

I feel the need to see how it worked out since then. The game has gone through ups and downs, and two different periods of juiced balls, which lends greater credence to Eric Walker's theory that the ball was juiced in 1993-1994 period.  I will work on it when I find time.

Still, looking at these numbers, and I'll recap my conclusions here, the difference is stark. Over the four seasons of playoffs, the expected team to win (based on how the pitchers pitched) went 67-15, the team having a DOM start went 81-37, and 56-12 when you take out the ties.  Teams with DIS starts had a 25-57 record, 11-43 without ties.

As I have been writing about for a number of years now, to maximize your team's chances of winning in the playoffs, you want to have a rotation of starters who have high DOM percentages  The Giants had that with Lincecum, Cain, Bumgarner, and Vogelsong.  And Sanchez was good too, as well as Zito, they were good in the context of depth. And as the 2021 Giants showed, having depth helps a team win, and he provided good depth.

As the 2011 Phillies showed, you can get DOM starts from all your starters in a series and still lose the series to a lesser team.  Getting DOM starts is no guarantee, particularly if the other team is dealing DOM starts too. You sometimes have to tip your cap.  But as the results of the four seasons studied showed, it is better than the alternative (DIS starts in particular).

One valid reaction to this is "so what, what's new about getting good starts means you win a lot?"  First, this is the first study I know of that studied quality starts' advantage in the playoffs.  Of course it's better, but by how much: DOM starts yielded 81-37 record (.686 winning percentage, 111 win season).  And that is the second thing, it quantifies the disadvantage of a DIS start.  While teams with a DOM start went 81-37, those with DIS went 25-57, and more crucially, 11-43 when against better pitching.

Quality Starting Pitching Depth

Most teams have a solid top 3 starters, but once you get to the 4th starter, most teams rotate and iterate through a number of pitchers for a variety of seasons, resulting in inconsistency from start to start, as well as poor overall results results. Let's look at Zito during his career with the Giants, and see the value of depth deep in the pitching rotation.

Early on, he was billed as the ace and was given the Opening Day start. In 2007-8, the Giants went 27-38 with him as the "ace" of the staff.  But once he was placed where he belonged, as the 4th starter, from 2009-12, the Giants went 59-48 (.551 winning percentage).  

A 4.26 ERA, which is what he had during that period, wasn't great, heck, it wasn't even league average, which was around 4.08.  Yet, even with a below average ERA and the Giants poor offense during that period, he was a pitcher who gave his team a good chance to win (they played at 90-win level), as the fourth starter, battling mostly other fourth starters.

So, depth clearly helps teams win during the season, and it helps win in the playoffs, as well, as we saw in 2010, 2012, and 2014.

Webb of Excitement for Aces

Of course, at least we are not starting with zero, as we have a 25 YO starting pitcher in Logan Webb, looking to carry on the great ace heritage that Lincecum, Cain, and Bumgarner set up not that long ago. And it is looking good, he seems to have figured things out in the early part of the 2021 season.

His first seven games, he was still figuring things out. He had a 5.34 ERA, but as a sign that he was starting to figure things out, his FIP was only 3.83, he had a high ERA due to his super-high BABIP of .375, and regression to the mean of .300 results in that okay FIP. His PQS showed signs too, with this progression: 2, 3, 0, 5, 4, 0. By his fourth start, he was starting to figure things out, as he had 2 DOM starts, but that last start, he was still wild, with 3 walks in 3 IP. However, lots of strikeouts, okay hits, no homers, signs of better things to come.

In the rest of the season, he did really well, especially once he came off the IL and they finally let him go without a pitch count limit (which was reasonable for a 24 YO pitcher coming off injury and a six-week layoff). In 20 games, he had a 2.40 ERA/2.41 FIP (BABIP of .293). He increased his strike throwing from 62% to 66%, as well as bumping up Strikes Looking from 18% to 19% and Strikes Swung from 11% to 13%. He also increased his great 1.53 ground ball to fly ball ratio to 1.68. And dropped his LD% from 29% to 21%.

And the quality of his starts took a huge leap. For Game Score, he went from 46 in that first part to 61 in the second part. Historically, per one study, 46 score is equivalent to a .500 record. And the Giants were 3-3 in those starts.  Game Score of 61, however, was equivalent to. a .650 record (21-11 over 32 start season, 105-57 for a whole season), and the Giants were 18-2 in those starts (.650 = 13-7 record, so they over performed).

Another way of looking at quality starts is the PQS system, which I've written a lot about and did annual studies of the Giants starting pitchers. In that early segment, there was 6 starts, and he had 2 DOMinant starts and 2 DISaster starts, for a 33% DOM and 33% DIS, mediocre and horrendous, respectively. But in the rest of the season, not counting the starts where he was held to a pitch count limit (which I decided were the first three starts coming off the IL), in 17 starts, he had 15 DOM starts and 1 DIS start, for a super elite, ace of aces, 88% DOM/6% DIS.  Even looking just at all of these overall, that is 74% DOM/13% DIS which is still super elite, ace of aces, as well.  We are talking Lincecum level of elite starting pitching! And by following all the rules, adding in those limited starts, he still had 17:5/26 for a still sterling 65% DOM/19% DIS season. 

Even more importantly, he was able to carry this level of quality into the post-season. He had two DOM starts out of two, in the playoff series with the Dodgers. As I've noted previously, some pitchers can't carry their high level of regular season dominance into the post-season. Peavy was one example of one who not only didn't carry it in, but was on the opposite pole of performance, with disaster starts. Hudson at least was able to improve with experience, when he was signed by the Giants, he had 3 DOM/1 DIS in 8 starts for a 38% DOM/13% DIS, okay, but not good, and then for the Giants he did well 2:1/4, ending his career with 4:1/6, which is very good. He learned, Peavy didn't. And some come out firing immediately, like Webb, Lincecum, Cain, and Bumgarner (though Lincecum often had bad first times, and Bumgarner was still figuring things out in 2012, resulting in a skipped post-season start). 

So, he looks like he can be a co-ace for the next few years. However, given his Tommy John surgery early on plus his mild right shoulder strain in 2021, he looks like he's on the Cain path of limited greatness (Cain had long history of elbow issues - chips - which eventually ended his career).  Hopefully not, but early history of pitching injuries is a sign of increased likelihood of a shortened career, people rarely get healthier, especially pitchers. I'm hopeful, however, that the pitching coaching expertise in the organization (Daniels, Bannister, et al) will work at helping young (and old) pitchers fix mechanical flaws that could lead to injuries. 

Internal Co-Ace Possibilities

Ideally, we need to pair him with at least another ace (like Gausman in 2021). But the best prospects for that - Seth Corry and Kyle Harrison - appears to be at least two full seasons away. Ryan Murphy busted out in 2021, his first full season as a pro, and if he can continue that ascent, he could maybe join the starting rotation in 2022, but he's likely two seasons away as well.  Sean Hjelle looks like to make the majors at some point in 2022, but he's more mid to back of rotation material, at the moment, given his lack of dominance in the upper levels. Only other interesting one in the minors is Mikell Manzano, who had a great season, but is only 18 YO and he did that in Rookie League.  Thus most are either too far low in the farm system, or just too wild to expect him to rise quickly, or both, so there are no young guns looking like they will join the 26-man roster anytime soon as a co-ace.

Sammy Long is probably the only one in our farm system who looks like he might progress and join Webb atop the rotation in 2022.  He had a nice 10.6 K/9 and 3.1 BB/9 for a good 3.44 K/BB ratio, for 2.05 ERA/2.86 FIP in AAA last season, leading to a nice 8.4 K/9 and 3.3 BB/9, for an okay 2.53 K/BB ratio.  Also, while it was his 25 YO season in 2021, he just missed the cutoff and is already basically 26.5 years old now and basically 27 YO when the season starts, so he's not exactly young, but at least young-ish.

He had five starts in 2021. One was more of an opener, as he went two innings and pitched well, so there was no reason to take him out, and another start was going okay (potential 3) but he had a lower back strain that put him on the IL. The other three: two DOM starts and a 3 PQS start, which could have been a 4 or 5, if allowed to stay in another inning (he was at 5 IP, only 91 pitches).  Plus, his second game was basically a start, and would have counted as a 4 PQS, another DOM start. So he had some dominant starts, and did not have a real disaster start, but really got hit hard in those starts. Not ideal, but something good to build on, I believe.

Game Score is a better tool than PQS with pitchers like Long, with length of start issues, which happens for the pitchers who are not top prospects when they are first brought up, they get used in a number of different ways, depending on team need. He had 3 really good starts (61, 51, 65) and two relatively bad (43, 37).  That averaged out to a 51 Game Score, which is usually good for a .560 winning percentage, which is good enough for a 91 win season. However, if you take the winning percentage for each start individually and average, that works out to .540, which is an 87 win season. 

So he looks like he'll be a nice addition to the starting rotation at some point, it is not really ace level yet. Still 40% (2 of 5) were 60+, so he does not need to learn a lot more to accelerate his performance as an MLB starting pitcher. Hopefully he can do that, as he made a big jump from A ball in 2019, followed by no season in 2020, to rising from starting out in AA to reaching the majors, in the 2021 season. 

So, the Giants can be aggressive with promotions with prospects under Zaidi. Just not always that likely (see Seth Corry's 2021 after the high expectations he set up with his 2019 season).  So unless Long can pull it off, or Murphy can be like Long and jump from AA (he's likely to be assigned there at the start of 2022, given how well he did in A+ in 2021) to MLB, the Giants will have to find Webb's co-ace among their free agent signings. 

No comments:

Post a Comment